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Abstract
Signcryption tag-KEM (Key Encapsulation Mechanism with a tag) is an authenticated tag-KEM for generic
construction of hybrid signcryption. Signcryption tag-KEM allows the sender to encapsulate a symmetric
key along with a tag so that the receiver can authenticate the sender, the key, and the tag. We present a
deﬁnition for the security of signcryption tag-KEM which is suitable for a recent signcryption setting. We
also present a proof of security for the previous generic construction of hybrid signcryption according to the
given deﬁnition.
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1 Introduction
Encryption and signature schemes are fundamental cryptographic tools for provid-
ing privacy and authenticity, respectively, in the public-key setting. Both privacy
and authenticity are simultaneously needed in many applications on ad-hoc network
where anyone can freely join or leave the network. This issue seems to be easily
solved by composing a signature and encryption. However, it was noticed by [2] that
such multi-user setting opens a possibility for some subtle attacks, not presented in
the settings of stand-alone signature and encryption. Thus, a simple composition
does not necessarily yield desired properties.
A signcryption was introduced by Zheng [8] as a primitive which simultaneously
provides both of privacy and authenticity. There are many works of signcryp-
tion [2,7,6,3]. An et al. [2] addressed proper modelling of signcryption. Then, Dodis
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et al. [7,6] modiﬁed the deﬁnition for security more reasonably in the multi-user
setting. Recently, Dent and Bjørstad [3] presented a tag-KEM/DEM framework for
generic construction of hybrid signcryption. The original tag-KEM/DEM [1] was
introduced for generic construction of hybrid encryption. The framework combines
tag-KEM (Key Encapsulation Mechanism with a tag) and DEM (Data Encryption
Mechanism). A tag-KEM uses asymmetric technique to encrypt a symmetric key
along with a tag, while the DEM uses a symmetric cipher to encrypt the message
payload using the key from the KEM.
Dent and Bjørstad [3] deﬁned an authenticated tag-KEM for hybrid signcryp-
tion, called signcryption tag-KEM, as a primitive which simultaneously satisﬁes
chosen ciphertext security for privacy and strong existential unforgeability for au-
thenticity. Moreover, they showed that adapting the tag-KEM/DEM construction
of hybrid encryption [1] to signcryption yields simpler scheme descriptions and bet-
ter generic security reductions than the previous works.
However, the security of signcryption tag-KEM is deﬁned for the previous def-
inition for security of signcryption [2] which restricts the adversary so that the
adversary is allowed to access de-signcryption oracle (resp. signcryption oracle) for
the attacked user but not signcryption oracle (resp. de-signcryption oracle) for the
attacked user if the adversary attacks privacy (resp. authenticity). On the other
hand, the modiﬁed deﬁnition [7,6] allows the adversary to access both oracles, irre-
spective of whether the adversary is attacking privacy or authenticity (such attack
is called simultaneous attack [6]). This means that the modiﬁed deﬁnition for se-
curity of signcryption becomes stronger than the previous one and the security of
signcryption tag-KEM in [3] is not enough strong for yielding the modiﬁed security
of signcryption.
Our Contribution. We deﬁne security of signcryption tag-KEM for the modiﬁed
deﬁnition of signcryption [7,6] which allows simultaneous attacks. Speciﬁcally, the
adversary is allowed to access all oracles corresponding to signcryption oracle and de-
signcryption oracle for the attacked user. When addressing security of signcryption,
there are two formalizations. One assumes that the adversary is an outsider who
only knows the public information. Such security is called Outsider security. The
other, stronger notion, assumes that the adversary is a legal user of the system.
Such security is called Insider security. In this paper, we consider the stronger
notion, i.e., Insider security. Then, we prove that the new deﬁnition for security of
signcryption tag-KEM also yields the modiﬁed deﬁnition for security of signcryption
with the same security reductions as in [3] by using the tag-KEM/DEM construction
of hybrid signcryption in [3].
2 Preliminaries
We review the deﬁnitions of signcryption in [7] and DEM in [1].
2.1 Signcryption
Syntax. A signcryption is deﬁned as a three-tuple of polynomial-time algorithms:
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• SC.Gen(1k), a key generation algorithm, takes as input a security parameter 1k,
and outputs a keypair (sk, pk) where sk is the user’s secret key and pk is the
user’s public key. Without loss of generality, it is assumed that pk is determined
from sk. The public key pk deﬁnes all relative spaces, i.e., space for messages
denoted by M. Note, that in the signcryption setting all participating parties
need to invoke SC.Gen. For a user P , denote its keys by skP and pkP .
• SEnc(skS , pkR,m), a signcryption algorithm, takes as input the sender’s secret
key skS , the receiver’s public key pkR, and a message m. It returns a signcryption
SC.
• V Dec(skR, pkS , SC), a de-signcryption algorithm, takes as input the receiver’s
secret key skR, the sender’s public key pkS , and a signcryption SC. It outputs a
message m or the unique error symbol ⊥ in case SC is “invalid.”
Completeness. For any sender S, any receiver R, and any message m ∈ M, if
(skS , pkS)← SC.Gen(1
k), (skR, pkR) ← SC.Gen(1
k), and C ← SEnc(skS ,
pkR,m), then V Dec(skR, pkS , C) = m.
Insider security. Insider-secure signcryption protects a given user U even if his
partner might be malicious. For privacy, if honest user S sent a signcryption to U
and later exposed his key to the adversary, the adversary still cannot decrypt the
signcryption. For authenticity, without U ’s secret key, the adversary cannot forge
signcryption from U to another user R, even with R’s secret key.
When addressing the security, we deal with two issues: Security goal and at-
tack model. In [7], for privacy and authenticity, a common type of security goal
and attack model is considered, called indistinguishability (IND)/strong existential
unforgeability (abbreviated as sUF, sEUF, or sEF) and chosen ciphertext attack
(CCA2)/chosen message attack (CMA), respectively. We denote the resulting se-
curity notion by IND-CCA2/sUF-CMA. The notation follows [2,7,3].
The security IND-CCA2 requires that any probabilistic polynomial time ad-
versary should be unable to ﬁnd any pair (m0,m1) for which he can distinguish
SEnc(skS , pkU ,m0) from SEnc(skS , pkU ,m1), with adaptive access to the follow-
ing two oracles for the attacked user U corresponding to each of SEnc and V Dec.
• OSE,U , the signcryption oracle, takes as input any user’s (receiver’s) public key
pk and any message m. It returns SEnc(skU , pk,m),
• OV D,U , the de-signcryption oracle, takes as input any user’s (sender’s) public key
pk and a signcryption SC. It returns V Dec(skU , pk, SC).
Allowing access to oracle OSE,U is a main diﬀerence from the previous deﬁnition [2].
To create “valid” signcryptions that the adversary must distinguish between, he
outputs the secret key skS of the user S sending messages to U . This means that
even when compromising S, the adversary is still unable to understand messages S
sent to U . Let ASC,cca be a probabilistic polynomial time oracle machine that plays
the following game.
(i) (skU , pkU )← SC.Gen(1
k).
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(ii) (m0,m1, skS , v) ← A
OSE,U ,OV D,U
SC,cca (pkU ).
(iii) b← {0, 1}.
(iv) SC ← SEnc(skS , pkU ,mb).
(v) b′ ← A
OSE,U ,OV D,U
SC,cca (v, SC).
In Step (iv), ASC,cca is restricted not to ask (pkS , SC) to de-signcryption oracle
OV D,U , but can still use, for example, (pkS′ , SC) for pkS′ = pkS . Variable v is state




∣Pr[b = b′]− 12
∣
∣ and SC,cca = maxASC,cca(AdvASC,cca) where
maximum is taken over all machines. We say that a signcryption is IND-CCA2-
secure if SC,cca is negligible in k.
The security sUF-CMA requires that any probabilistic polynomial time adver-
sary should not only be able to generate a “valid” signcryption SC of some message
m from U to any user R, with adaptive access to the above two oracles. Allowing
access to oracle OV D,U is a main diﬀerence from the previous deﬁnition [2]. In order
to deﬁne “valid,” the adversary is allowed to come up with the presumed secret key
skR as part of his forgery. Let ASC,cma be a probabilistic polynomial time oracle
machine that plays the following game.
(i) (skU , pkU )← SC.Gen(1
k).
(ii) (SC, skR) ← A
OSE,U ,OV D,U
SC,cma (pkU ).
In Step (ii), ASC,cma is restricted not to obtain SC in response to any SEnc(skU ,
pkR,m) query, i.e., any OSE,U query on the public key pkR and some message
m. ASC,cma is considered successful only if V Dec(skR, pkU , SC) = ⊥. We deﬁne
AdvASC,cma as the probability it succeeds, and SC,cma = maxASC,cma(AdvASC,cma)
where maximum is taken over all machines. We say that a signcryption is sUF-
CMA-secure if SC,cma is negligible in k.
2.2 DEM
Syntax. A DEM is deﬁned as a tuple of two polynomial-time algorithms (Enc,Dec)
associated to (symmetric) key-space KD deﬁned by the security parameter k. We
consider KD is {0, 1}
k and message space is {0, 1}∗. Here we omit the detail descrip-
tion of these algorithms except the minimum syntax description, Enc(dk,m) = C
and Dec(dk,C) = m.
Completeness. For any symmetric key dk ∈ KD and any message m ∈ {0, 1}
∗,
Dec(dk,Enc(dk,m)) = m.
Security. For the purposes of this paper, we only require passive security for DEM
as [3]. Let AD be a probabilistic polynomial time machine that plays the following
game.
(i) (m0,m1, v) ← AD(1
k)
(ii) K ← KD, ξ ← {0, 1}, C ← Enc(K,mξ).
(iii) ξ′ ← AD(v,C).
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We deﬁne AdvAD =
∣
∣Pr[ξ = ξ′]− 12
∣
∣ and D = maxAD(AdvAD ) where maximum is
taken over all machines. We say that DEM is one-time secure if D is negligible in
k.
3 New Deﬁnition for Insider Security
We now deﬁne the notion of Insider security for signcryption tag-KEM. In the
previous model of signcryption tag-KEM in [3], the sender’s key and the receiver’s
key are generated by diﬀerent algorithms while in a general model of signcryption
the keys are generated by the same algorithm. We follow the general model of
signcryption.
3.1 Syntax of Signcryption Tag-KEMs
A signcryption tag-KEM is deﬁned as a four-tuple of polynomial-time algorithms:
• SCTK.Gen(1k), a key generation algorithm, takes as input a security parameter
1k, and outputs a pair of keys (sk, pk) where sk is the user’s secret key and pk
the user’s public key. Without loss of generality, we assume that pk is determined
from sk. The public key pk deﬁnes all relative spaces, i.e., spaces for tags and
encapsulated keys denoted by T and KK , respectively.
• Sym(skS , pkR), a symmetric key generation algorithm, takes as input the secret
key of the sender skS and the public key of the receiver pkR. It outputs a sym-
metric key K ∈ KD together with internal state information ω where KD is the
key space of DEM.
• SEncap(ω, τ), a key encapsulation algorithm, takes as input the state information
ω and an arbitrary tag τ . It returns an encapsulation E.
• V Decap(skR, pkS , E, τ), a decapsulation algorithm, takes as input the receiver’s
secret key skR, the sender’s public key pkS , an encapsulation E, and a tag τ . It
outputs a symmetric key K or the unique error symbol ⊥ in case E is “invalid.”
Completeness. For any sender S, any receiver R, and any tag τ ∈ T , if (skS , pkS) ←
SCTK.Gen(1k), (skR, pkR)← SCTK.Gen(1
k), and (K,ω) ← Sym(skS , pkR), then
V Decap(skR, pkS , SEncap(ω, τ), τ) = K.
3.2 Insider Security of Signcryption tag-KEM
The deﬁnition for Insider security of signcryption and signcryption tag-KEM in [3]
neither mention nor allow simultaneous attacks. Therefore, we deﬁne the notion of
Insider security so that the adversary has access to all oracles associated with not
only OSE,U but also OV D,U .
We consider IND/sUF and CCA2/CMA as security goal and attack model, re-
spectively. We denote the resulting security notion by IND-CCA2/sUF-CMA.
The security IND-CCA2 requires that any probabilistic polynomial time adver-
sary should be unable to distinguish whether a given K is the one embedded in an
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encapsulation (E, τ) or not, with adaptive access to three oracles for the attacked
user U corresponding to each of Sym, SEncap, and V Decap.
• OS,U , the symmetric key generation oracle, takes as input any user’s (receiver’s)
public key pk, runs Sym(skU , pk), and obtains (K,ω). It then stores the value
ω (hidden from the view of the adversary, and overwriting any previously stored
values), and returns the symmetric key K.
• OE,U , the key encapsulation oracle, takes as input an arbitrary tag τ , and checks
whether there exists a stored value ω. If there is not, it returns ⊥ and terminates.
Otherwise it erases the value from storage, and returns SEncap(ω, τ).
• OD,U , the key decapsulation oracle, takes as input any user’s (sender’s) public
key pk, an encapsulation E, and a tag τ . It returns V Decap(skU , pk,E, τ).
Note that oracles OS,U andOE,U correspond to OSE,U , and oracle OD,U corresponds
to OV D,U . Allowing access to oracles OS,U and OE,U is a main diﬀerence from the
previous deﬁnition [3].
To create “valid” encapsulations that the adversary must distinguish between,
he outputs the secret key skS of the user S embedding a key for U same as the
adversary against signcryption in [7]. This means that even when compromising S,
the adversary is still unable to understand keys S embedded for U . Let ASCTK,cca
be a probabilistic polynomial time oracle machine that plays the following game.
(i) (skU , pkU )← SCTK.Gen(1
k).
(ii) (skS , v1) ← A
OS,U ,OE,U ,OD,U
SCTK,cca (pkU ).
(iii) (K1, ω) ← Sym(skS , pkU ), K0 ← KD, δ ← {0, 1}.
(iv) (τ, v2) ← A
OS,U ,OE,U ,OD,U
SCTK,cca (v1,Kδ).
(v) E ← Encap(ω, τ).
(vi) δ′ ← A
OS,U ,OE,U ,OD,U
SCTK,cca (v2, E).
In Step (vi), ASCTK,cca is restricted not to ask (pkS , E, τ) to the decapsulation
oracle OD,U , but can still use, for example, (pkS′ , E, τ
′) for pkS′ = pkS or τ
′ = τ .
Variables v1, v2 are state information of the adversary. ASCTK,cca is considered
successful only if δ = δ′. We deﬁne IND-CCA2-security similarly with the deﬁnition
for AdvASCTK,cca =
∣
∣Pr[δ = δ′]− 12
∣
∣ and SCTK,cca = maxASCTK,cca(AdvASCTK,cca).
The security sUF-CMA requires that any probabilistic polynomial time adver-
sary should not be able to generate a “valid” encapsulation E from U to any user R,
with adaptive access to the three oracles. Allowing access to oracle OD,U is a main
diﬀerence from the previous deﬁnition [3]. In order to deﬁne “valid,” we also allow
the adversary to come up with the presumed secret key skR as part of his forgery
same as the adversary against signcryption in [7]. Let ASCTK,cma be a probabilistic
polynomial time oracle machine that plays the following game.
(i) (skU , pkU )← SCTK.Gen(1
k).
(ii) (E, τ, skR) ← A
OS,U ,OE,U ,OD,U
SCTK,cma (pkU ).
In Step (ii), ASCTK,cma is restricted not to obtain E in response to any SEncap(ω, τ)
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query with (K,ω) ← Sym(skU , pkR), i.e., any OE,U query on the tag τ and a value ω
stored by an OS,U query on the public key pkR. ASCTK,cma is considered successful
only if V Decap(skR, pkU , E, τ) = ⊥. We deﬁne sUF-CMA-security similarly with
the deﬁnition for AdvASCTK,cma , the probability ASCTK,cma succeeds, SCTK,cma =
maxASCTK,cma(AdvASCTK,cma).
4 Generic Construction of Hybrid Signcryption and Its
Security Proof
We review the generic construction of hybrid signcryption in [3], and prove that the
new deﬁnition for security of signcryption tag-KEM yields the modiﬁed deﬁnition
for security of signcryption in [7].
4.1 Generic Construction of Hybrid Signcryption
The construction is based on the same idea of the generic construction of hybrid
asymmetric encryption proposed in [1].
• SC.Gen(1k)
(sk, pk) ← SCTK.Gen(1k). Output (sk, pk).
• SEnc(skS , pkR,m)
(i) (K,ω) ← Sym(skS , pkR).
(ii) C ← Enc(K,m).
(iii) E ← SEncap(ω,C).
(iv) SC ← (E,C). Output SC.
• V Dec(skR, pkS , SC)
(i) SC ← (E,C).
(ii) If ⊥ ← V Decap(skR, pkS , E,C), output ⊥ and terminate.
(iii) Otherwise K ← V Decap(skR, pkS , E,C).
(iv) m← Dec(K,C). Output m.
4.2 Proof of the Security
We now turn to proving security of the hybrid signcryption scheme.
Theorem 4.1 If signcryption tag-KEM is IND-CCA2 secure and DEM is one-time
secure, then the hybrid signcryption scheme in Section 4.1 is IND-CCA2 secure
where SC,cca ≤ 2SCTK,cca + D. Moreover, if signcryption tag-KEM is sUF-CMA
secure, then the hybrid signcryption scheme in Section 4.1 is sUF-CMA secure where
SC,cma ≤ SCTK,cma.
The proof is almost the same as the one for the previous deﬁnition for security.
We present here the proof for the IND-CCA2 security. The IND-CCA2 security of
hybrid signcryption is proven in the same way as the IND-CCA2 security of hybrid
encryption in [1].
Proof. Let Game 0 be the regular IND-CCA2 game for signcryption.
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(i) (skU , pkU )← Gen(1
k).
(ii) (m0,m1, skS , v) ← A
OSE,U ,OV D,U
SC,cca (pkU ).
(iii) b← {0, 1}.
(iv) (ω,K) ← Sym(skS , pkU ), C ← Enc(K,mb), E ← SEncap(ω,C),
SC ← (E,C).
(v) b′ ← A
OSE,U ,OV D,U
SC,cca (v, SC).
In the following game, the game is altered to use a random key when generating
the challenge signcryption, rather than the real key output by Sym. We refer to
the resulting game as Game 1.
(i) (skU , pkU )← Gen(1
k).
(ii) (m0,m1, skS , v) ← A
OSE,U ,OV D,U
SC,cca (pkU ).
(iii) b← {0, 1}.
(iv) (ω,K) ← Sym(skS , pkU ), K
′ ← KD, C ← Enc(K
′,mb),
E ← SEncap(ω,C), SC ← (E,C).
(v) b′ ← A
OSE,U ,OV D,U
SC,cca (v, SC).
Let X0 and X1 be the events that b = b
′ in Game 0 and Game 1, respectively.
We can prove the theorem by showing that |Pr[X1] − Pr[X0]| ≤ 2SCTK,cca and
|Pr[X1] −
1
2 | ≤ D. The proof of both inequality are slightly diﬀerent from the
previous proof because of access to OD,U . In the following, we prove the former
inequality by constructing ASCTK,cca that attacks the underlying signcryption tag-
KEM by using ASC,cca. First, ASCTK,cca is given public key pkU and passes it
to ASC,cca. Given m0 and m1 from ASC,cca, ASCTK,cca requests a challenge Kδ
of the game. ASCTK,cca then selects b ← {0, 1} and computes C = Enc(Kδ ,mb).
By sending oracle OE,U C as a tag, ASCTK,cca receives E and sends signcryption
(E,C) to ASC,cca. For every query from ASC,cca to oracle OSE,U , ASCTK,cca sends
oracle OS,U the public key, and uses the returned key, Enc, and oracle OE,U in
the same way. Every query from ASC,cca to oracle OV D,U is forwarded to oracle
OD,U . If ⊥ is returned, it is forwarded to ASC,cca. Otherwise, ASCTK,cca decrypts
E by using the key given from OD,U , and passes the resulting message to ASC,cca.
When ASC,cca outputs b
′ = b, ASCTK,cca outputs δ
′ = 1 meaning that Kδ is the
real key. Otherwise, ASCTK,cca outputs δ
′ = 0 meaning that Kδ is random. We
can prove that the view of ASC,cca is identical to that in Game 0 when δ = 1,
and that in Game 1 when δ = 0. Accordingly, Pr[b′ = b|δ = 1] = Pr[X0] and
Pr[b′ = b|δ = 0] = Pr[X1]. Therefore, it holds















Since |Pr[δ′ = δ]− 12 | ≤ SCTK,cca, we have |Pr[X1]− Pr[X0]| ≤ 2SCTK,cca. 
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5 Conclusion
We have presented the security notion for signcryption tag-KEM and proven security
of the previous construction of hybrid signcryption according to the given deﬁnition.
One of the future works is to present a construction of optimal signcryption tag-
KEM.
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